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Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in
Urban Renewal
The burgeoning urban renewal programs' of American cities have
too often been accompanied by a sorry failure to rehouse displacees from
project sites.2 Throughout the 1950's and into the 1960's, it was not in-
frequent for well over half those displaced to relocate back into struc-
turally substandard units,3 and relocation typically brought no amelio-
ration of the overcrowded living conditions common among the urban
poor.4 Substantially higher rents resulted from the decrease in low-in-
come housing as slums and blighted areas were bulldozed to make way
for office buildings and high-rent apartments.5 The psychological and
economic repercussions of eviction and neighborhood clearance aggra-
vated the problems of decent housing."
1. The urban renewal program was created as Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1441-68 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965). For general descriptions of the pro.
gram, see Johnstone, The Federal Renewal Program, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 301 (1958); Foard
& Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislatzon, 25 LAw 8, CON'rEMP. PROn. 635 (1960);
S. GREER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES (1965) [hereinafter cited as GREn];
C. ABRAMS, Tim CIY Is THE FRONTIER (1965) [hereinafter cited as ABRAMs]; URBAN RE-
NEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERsY (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
While the focus of this Note is on the Title I program as administered by the Renewal
Assistance Administration (RAA) of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), relocation under the new Demonstration Cities legislation and under the public
housing program is governed by statutes similar to the urban renewal relocation provision,
Housing Act of 1949 § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (Supp. I, 1965). See Demonstration Cities
and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 § 107, 1966 US. CODE CONG. & AD. Nvws 1471;
Housing Act of 1937 § 15(7), 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (1964).
2. For a thorough review of the findings of relocation studies up to 1964, see Hartman,
The Housing of Relocation Families, 30 J. Am. INst. PLANNERS 266 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Hartman]. Two recent studies using original data have also concluded that the
rehousing of displaced families has been unsatisfactory. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PEOPLE AND BlUSI-
NEssrs DISPLACED By GOVERNMENTS 27-52, 114-16, 127 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Aovisosn
COMMIssION]; P. NiEBANcK, THE ELDERLY IN OLDER URBAN ARE,s 126-62 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as NIEBANCK]. See also Gans, The Human Implications of Current Redevelopment
and Relocation Planning, 25 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 15 (1961), Grigsby, Housing and Slum
Clearance: Elusive Goals, 352 ANNALS 107 (1964); ABRAMS 132-54; A. Senoast, SLUMS AND
SOCIAL INSECURITY 61-68 (1963).
As it is estimated that displacements from renewal areas will continue in the near future
at the rate of about 125,000 persons a year, the question of what provisions are made for
these people is of no small importance. NIERANCE 13.
3. Hartman 270-71, 278.
4. Hartman 270-78; NmANCK 126-32. The majority of displacees are poverty-stricken
within the meaning of the Social Security Administration's guidelines. See US. Housing
& Home Finance Agency (HHFA), The Housing of Relocated Families: Summary of a
Census Bureau Survey, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTRovas v 87
(J. Wilson ed. 1966).
5. Hartman 273; NIEBANCK 126-32.
6. A. ScHoRR, supra note 2, at 68-73; NBANcK 4-5, 133-44; H. GANS, Tim URBAN
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The impact of inadequate relocation has been disproportionately se-
vere on Negroes and other minority groups. Most displacees have been
Negro, and residential segregation has barred their relocation in better
neighborhoods, thereby perpetuating or intensifying segregated living
patterns7 and magnifying the harshness of the whole procedure.8
As a consequence, urban renewal has made those most lacking in
social and economic resources bear a major share of the social and eco-
nomic costs of redeveloping our cities. For this reason the program has
all too frequently complicated rather than mitigated our urban ills.0
While relocation has improved in the past few years,10 complaints from
VLmLAGERs 305-35 (1962). See also Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of
Relocation, in TnE URBAN CoNnrmoN (L. DuhI ed. 1963); Fried & Gleicher, Some Sources
of Residential Satisfaction in an Urban Slum, 27 J. Ar. INsr. PL.NNERs 305 (1901). Thee
studies show that providing displacees with standard housing would not necessarily make
them net beneficiaries of urban renewal. Other indices of social well-being besides housing
quality can be adversely affected by displacement and relocation. Satistactory rehousing
is thus best regarded as compensatory in character. See note 13 infra.
7. NATIONAL CoifrnmnrEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION iN HOUSINc, How THE FEDERIAL COV-
EREmNT BUILDS GEnros 6-7, 11-12, 19-27 (1967); W. voN ECFA=, BuLLDozErs AND BUnnAU-
CRATs: CIrus AND URBAN RENEwAL 47-56 (1963); GRE.R 54-55, 141-64; AnnAms 145. See also
Frieden, The Legal Role in Urban Development, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 856, 867-69. The
recent case of Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967), involved a complaint
of purposeful "Negro removal," and in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 205 F.
Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967), plaintiffs alleged that public housing In Chicago had been in.
tentionally located in ghetto sites.
8. Hartman 273-74. Greer makes the following points in his penetrating study:
Although Negroes occupy only about one-fourth of the substandard dwelling units
in the nation, nearly 70 per cent of the dwelling units condemned for urban renewal
projects have been Negro residences. This is largely due to their central location and
deteriorated conditions, but the effects are the same as they would be if dehousing
Negroes were the goal. This is little indication that urban renewal has had any
intention or effect of increasing the housing open to Negro occupancy, with the ex-
ception of public housing and a few relocation housing projects. Most of the 97 per
cent of housing in the "standing stock" remains dosed to Negroes, while a portion of
that which is available to them is being destroyed.
GRra 151. Other groups particularly hard hit by displacement are large families and the
elderly. AnvisoRY Co.scissxoN 34-39; NimnAxcK 126-62.
9. See ABRAms 23-35, 84-85, 177-79; GaERm 3, 151-53; Gans, The Failure of Urban Re-
newal: A Critique and Some Proposals, CoArn.iwrAY, April, 1967, at 29-37.
10. In 1964 the U.S. Census Bureau at the request of then-HHFA Administrator
Robert C. Weaver did a survey of families then being relocated. The results indicated that
relocation was considerably more satisfactory in 194 than in previous years, as judged
by other studies. Chester Hartman has shown that this study was biased in several signifi.
cant respects, however. Moreover, even the study itself revealed that one price of improved
housing was unreasonably high rents. Still, it is probably true that relocation has im-
proved somewhat. The Housing of Relocated Families: Sutnmar' of a Census Bureau
Survey 9- Hartman, Comment on the HHFA Study of Relocation, in Ur.&, RNE ,VA.-
TBE RECORD AND THE CoNTRovERsy 336, 353 (J. Wilson ed. 1966). See also Secretary Weaver's
discussion in R. WvEAVER, DmLmbiAs OF URBAN AsrzmcA 40-77 (1965). On the quality of
federal statistics in this area, see Hartman 280; AnnAms 136, 143. Other observers agree that
relocation has recently improved. NERAcK 146; Glazer, Housing Problems and Housing
Policies, PuBLIc INTE r, Spring, 1967, at 21, 48.
Three factors seem to have contributed to this improvement: the low,-income housing
shortage has been less acute in the mid-1960's, Congress has recently increased federal aids
for rehousing displacees, and the Kennedy-Johnson appointees have apparently been
willing to enforce the relocation requirements somewhat more rigorously than their pre-
decessors. See R. WEAVER, supra) at 61-75; Ga.ER 103.
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displacees continue,"1 and even if the improvements are trustingly as-
sumed permanent, there is no reason to believe the relocation problem
has been solved.
The bleakness of the relocation landscape contrasts strikingly with the
rosy picture painted by the urban renewal legislation. The Declaration
of Policy in the Housing Act of 194912 stated explicitly the central goal
of a decent home for every American family, and Section 105(c) specifi-
cally guaranteed "decent, safe and sanitary" rehousing to families dis-
placed in Title I slum-clearance projects.' In defining the conditions of
11. Within recent months, for example, the NAACP has assisted displacee groups In
filing complaints with HUD alleging the existence of inadequate relocation facilities for
projects in Baltimore, Maryland and Pulaski, Tennessee. In New Haven, Connecticut,
where urban renewal is supposed to have made its most significant contribution, the
organized poor have recently accused the Local Public Agency (LPA) of moving displacces
from one slum to another and causing an exodus of slumdwellers to nearby Bridgeport.
New Haven Journal-Courier, April 28, 1967, at 1, col. 5. See also Wilhelm, The Success
and Tragedy of Richard Lee, Tim NE w JOURNAL, Oct. 15, 1957, at 5. Similar issues were
raised in the recent case of Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denlied,
387 U.S. 932 (1967).
12. Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964). The Declaration provides:
The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the
health and living standards of its people require housing production and related coin
munity development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination
of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums mid
blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family .... The Housing and
Home Finance Agency and its constituent agencies . . . shall exercise their powers,
functions, and duties under this or any other law, consistently with the national
housing policy declared by this Act ....
This Declaration should be read in light of subsequent amendments to the Housing
Act which allow increased use of federal funds for non-residential projects. Housing Act
of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, § 110, 68 Stat. 626; Housing Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1020,
§ 302, 70 Stat. 1098; Housing Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, § 413, 78 Stat. 675; Housing
Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 308, 75 Stat. 168; Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 308, 79 Stat. 477; 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c), as amended, (Supp. i,
1965). The amendments suggest a broader purpose for the program as a whole. Rehousing,
while still important, can no longer be said to be the sole objective. See the broader
declaration prefacing the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of
1966 § 101, 1966 U.S. CODE CoG. & AD. NEws 1467.
13. The original Section 105(c), Housing Act of 1949, ch. 38, § 105, 63 Stat. 416,
provided:
Contracts for financial aid shall be made only with a duly authorized local public
agency and shall require that-
(c) There be a feasible method for the temporary relocation of families displaced
from the project area, and that there are or are being provided, in the project area or
in other areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and
commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the families
displaced from the project area, decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings equal in number
to the number of and available to such displaced families and reasonably accessible
to their places of employment ....
Congress has never weakened Section 105(c) and has recently moved to strengthen It In
several significant respects. The 1964 amendments broadened the coverage to individuals
as well as families and required that each community establish a special relocation as-
sistance program to minimize the hardships of displacement. Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-560, § 305, 78 Stat. 786. In 1965, the requirements of careful planning and co-
ordination with other federal programs were further elaborated, and Subsection 105(c)(2)
was added to require the federal agency to extract, as a condition of further assistance,
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the contract between the local public agency (LPA) and the Housing &
Home Finance Agency (HHFA)-now the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD)-Section 105(c) provided that federal
funds were to be granted only where HHFA found that housing meet-
ing the statutory standards was available or being made available.'L
Given the divergence between the harsh facts of relocation and the
statutory ideal, it is not surprising that displacees turned to the courts
for help. Not unreasonably, they hoped that judicial review could end
administrative disregard of the provisions of the Act protecting their in-
terests. To date, however, the federal courts; have denied standing to
private citizens seeking to enforce the relocation requirements of Sec-
tion 105(c).' 6 The reasons given for this denial have not been compel-
ling. The arguments of the judges mesh so poorly with decisions in
reassurances from localities carrying out projects that relocation housing is available.
42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(2) (Supp. I, 1965).
The public housing statute contains a provision similar to Section 105(c), and the new
Demonstration Cities Act incorporates 105(c) by reference. See note 1 supra.
14. Before the creation of HUD, the determination that statutory relocation housing
was feasible was a non-delegable responsibility of the HHFA Administrator. Housing Act
of 1949 § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1964). Today it is a non-delegable function of the
Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance. 31 Fed. Reg. 8964-5 (1956).
See also Section 105(c)(2) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(2) (Supp. I, 1965).
In making this determination, the federal agency has chosen to rely largely on data sup-
plied by the locality, particularly information in the relocation plan. RAA, UnAN RENEWAL
ANAL. § 16. The statute and legislative history emphasize that the planning and carrying
out of a program are a local responsibility. Housing Act of 1949 §§ 2, 101, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1441, 1451 (1964); S. ReP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1949). However, this emphasis
should not becloud the federal responsibility to determine whether or not statutory relo-
cation is in fact feasible. This responsibility may well require (1) demanding more
extensive data from the localities and (2) developing independent means to determine the
accuracy of the information supplied.
15. The focus of this Note is on the federal courts, as the state remedy is generally
agreed to be inadequate. Moreover, substantial questions involving the operation of a
major federal program are involved. State courts have held that the enforcement of
Section 105(c) is the duty of the federal agency and they have refused to review its deter-
minations, Spadanuta v. Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre, 33 Misc. 2d 499, 224
N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. CL
1953); Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn.
1, 13, 104 NAV.2d 864, 873 (1960). State enabling legislation is typically far more permis-
sive regarding relocation than the federal act. Compare Section 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)
(Supp. I, 1965), with CONN. REv. STAT. § 8-127 (1966). State courts have almost invariably
held that the relocation planning satisfied their own statutes, even when the state reloca-
tion provision was patterned after Section 105(c). Sanguinetti v. City Council, 231 Cal. App.
2d 813, 819-20, 42 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271-72 (1965); Horton v. Redevelopment Comm n, 262
N.C. 306, 317-18, 137 S.E.2d 115, 123-24 (1964); Housing and Redevelopment Authority v.
Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn. 1, 11-13, 104 N.W.2d 864, 872-73 (19G0). On
the general problems of state review of urban renewal planning, see Note, Scope of judicial
Review in Urban Renewal Litigation, 17 VANo. L. REv. 1235 (1964); Note, judicial Review
of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determinations, 69 YAx L.J. 321 (1959).
16. Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1967). Johnson v. Redevelopment
Agency 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1965); Harriion-HaLsted Com-
munity Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
See also Watts v. Housing Authority, 150 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ala. 1956) (complaint dis-
missed for improper class action).
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allied standing cases that other explanations must be sought for their
willingness to leave displacees out in the cold.
Standing Under the Housing Act of 1949
Green Street Association v. Daley,'1 decided in 1967, presents most
dearly the issue of displacee standing. In Green Street the Seventh Cir-
cuit denied standing to plaintiffs alleging inadequate relocation facili-
ties on the theory that the provisions of the Housing Act of 1949 did not
confer private legal rights on displacees.1' The court in reaching this
conclusion followed closely its 1962 decision in Harrison-Halsted Com-
munity Groups Inc. v. HHFA, where a similar relocation challenge was
involved.19 Green Street also paralleled Johnson v. Redevelopment
Agency of Oakland,2 0 a 1963 decision in a suit against an LPA rather
than HHFA, in which the Ninth Circuit held that "Congress [had not]
intended this section [105(c)] of the Housing Act to give a right of ac-
tion to those not a party to the contract between the Redevelopment
Agency and the United States." 21
These Section 105(c) decisions bear no resemblance to cases in other
Circuits where displacees have been granted standing to enforce differ-
ent but hardly distinguishable provisions of the Housing Act of 1949. In
Gart v. Cole (1959),2 Chief Judge Clark held for the Second Circuit
17. 873 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967).
18. Id. at 5, 8.
19. 310 F.2d 99, 102-05 (7th Cir. 1962). As the Housing Act contains no review provi-
sions, the right to review in Green Street and Harrison.Halsted was claimed under Section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), now Chapter 7 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code.
Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. 11, 1965.66). Section 10
provides in part:
[E]xcept to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law ....
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, Is entitled to
judicial review thereof.
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-02, 704 (Supp. II, 1965-66).
20. 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963).
21. Id. at 874. Insofar as the thrust of plaintiffs' complaint in Johnson was against the
relocation plan, it would appear that the HHFA Administrator should have been joined
and review sought under the APA. See note 19 supra. The final determination that statu-
tory relocation was feasible was the Administrator's. He may well have based the decision
to grant funds partially on information not contained in the relocation plan submitted by
the LPA. See note 14 supra. Although it seems unlikely, plaintiffs in Johnson may only
have been complaining of the LPA's failure to carry out a program of statutory relocation.
In this case it would seem unnecessary to join the Administrator. See p. 976 infra. In any
event, the language in Johnson is broad enough to cover any displacee suit, regardlesg of
defendants.
22. 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
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that section 101(c) of the Act, which barred the HHFA Administrator
from delegating the decision upon the feasibility of relocation, was for
the protection of displacees; they therefore had standing to challenge an
alleged delegation.23 In the more recent case of Merge v. Sliarott (1965),
the Third Circuit held on similar grounds that a displaced industrial
concern had standing to challenge as arbitrary and capricious the
HHFA's findings regarding moving expenses, compensable under Sec-
tion 114 of the Act.
24
Nothing in the statute or legislative history suggests a basis for distin-
guishing Section 105(c) from Sections 101(c) and 114 with regard to
the standing question. Indeed the court in Merge treated the three as
peas in the same pod, emphasizing that relocation payments were only
one of several Congressional measures to further the interests of dis-
placees. After stating that "Congress from the first ha[s] evidenced a
real and recurring concern for persons displaced as a result of the
program,"'25 the court detailed the evidence of this concern, citing Sec-
tions 105(c), 101(c) and 114.26
Why then have the courts denied standing where Section 105(c) is
involved but not othenvise? One might conclude that the pattern is
coincidental and that the decisions merely reflect different interpreta-
tions of conflicting precedents in the standing area. But chance does
not explain why courts should continue dipping into the grab bag of
precedent to emerge with opposing conclusions for similar sections of
the Housing Act. Moreover, past decisions are not all that awry. No
wild-eyed interpretation of existing standing law is needed to suggest
that displacees should be able to obtain judicial review of the Secre-
tary's determination that statutory relocation is feasible, and to enforce
the relocation obligation assumed by the municipality when it accepts
Title I aid.
As the preceding sentence suggests, the problem of standing under
Section 105(c) may arise at two different points. The first is when the
23. Id. at 251. Similarly, the court held that the plaintiffs also had standing under the
APA to challenge the Administrator's refusal to grant them an oral hearing on the
feasibility of the city's relocation plan. Id. at 250.
24. 941 F.2d 989, 994 (3d Cir. 1965). Moving expenses of persons as well as businesses
and made compensable by Section 114,42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I. 1965).
The Administrator has discretion as to whether or not to pay relocation eixpene in a
particular project. 42 U.S.C. § 1465(a) (1964). Typically, as in MAerge, the Title I contract
between the LPA and HI-FA contains provision for the pa)ment of thee expenses. 341
F.2d at 993. The court held that in these circumstances the payments could not be
determined arbitrarily or capriciously. 341 F.2d at 994. Review in ferge was sought
under the APA. 341 F.2d at 991.
25. 341 F.2d at 993.
26. 341 F.2d at 993 n.6.
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Secretary makes, or fails to make, a finding of the feasibility of adequate
rehousing preliminary to entering a contract with the LPA for federal
funds. The Housing Act makes no explicit provision for review of HUD
determinations of relocation feasibility, but plaintiffs wishing to chal-
lenge the Secretary at this stage may enlist Section 10 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. That section provides that judicial review is avail-
able to any person "suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute," except when the statute precludes review or when
agency action is "committed to agency discretion by law."27
Section 105(c) cannot be read to fall into either of these exceptions
without doing substantial violence to the Housing Act or to existing
case law. Nothing in the 1949 Act nor in later legislation suggests that
Congress meant to preclude review of the finding required by Section
105(c).28 The exception for agency action committed to agency discre-
tion by law is more mysterious. Inasmuch as all agency action involves
some degree of discretion, this exception has that quality which per-
vades the Administrative Procedure Act of taking back by exception
everything granted by a substantive provision. The courts, however,
have declined to read Section 10 out of existence, and have held review-
able agency action involving discretion of a nature similar to that in-
volved in Section 105(c). 29 The courts in Harrison-Halsted and Green
Street apparently reached the conclusion argued for here. Neither deci-
sion invokes any exception to Section 10 which would make the 105(c)
finding inherently unreviewable; instead, both focus on the legal capac-
ity of the particular plaintiffs.30
27. The relevant parts of Section 10 axe set out in note 19 supra.
28. In fact, the suggestion is just the opposite. Since Congress has given the Admin-
istrator authority to make moving expense determinations non-reviewable, it can be
argued that if Congress had intended that the 105(c) finding not be reviewed, It would
have written a similar provision into the Act. See Housing Act of 1949 § 114(d), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1465(d) (1964).
29. Recent decisions in which findings involving agency discretion were held reviewable
under the APA include Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 386-87 (8th CIr.
1966) (Comptroller's decision granting bank charter); Freeman v. Brown, 342 F.2d 205,
212-13 (5th CiT. 1965) (Secretary's decisions classifying tobacco under price support pro.
gram). See also the Merge case, discussed at pp. 970-71 supra.
One recent case developed the idea that reviewable agency decisions were "mandatory"
rather than "permissive" from an agency point of view. Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th
Cir. 1964). Even by this test, the 105(c) finding would be reviewable. See 4 K. DAvis, AD.
MINISTRATIVE LAW § 28.16 (1965 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as DAVIs]. Moreover, the argu-
ment against letting this provision bar review is buttressed by what Jaffe has called the
case law presumption of reviewability. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL oF ADMINISTRATIVP.
AcTIoN 336-63 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958);
Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958). At a minimum, the APA codified the presumption
of reviewability. JAFFE 372-76; H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946). See
also Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 380 (1962); Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956).
30. See p. 970 supra.
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On this question of simple standing, Section 10 at a minimum codi-
fied the pre-APA law.31 As long ago as 1924 the Supreme Court held
that standing to challenge administrative action existed where a statute
recognized and sought to protect an interest and one sharing that in-
terest alleges its disregard by the agency.3 2 Although the Chicago Junc-
tion Case dealt with an alleged failure by the ICC to give proper weight
to statutory criteria governing rail acquisitions and the protection of
competitors, the principle established is equally applicable to a deci-
sion by HUD on relocation feasibility. The language and legislative
history of the Housing Act demonstrate that Congress recognized the
interests of displacees in "decent, safe, and sanitary" housing, and
drafted Section 105(c) to protect those interests.33 Since before the APA
plaintiffs would have had standing, it would be anomalous to argue
that their position is less satisfactory under a statute assumed to have
codified prior law.34
31. This is the position taken in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. 'McKay, 225 F.2d
924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). The relevant sections of the APA are set
out in note 19 supra. This interpretation relies heavily on the Attorney General's statement
that the standing provision "reflects existing law." S. Doe. No. 2-8, 79th Cong., 2nd Sns.
310 (1946). Other legislative history, however, suggests that the APA meant to expand
standing. Id. at 276. The question is debated in 3 DA-is § 22-02, and JAFFE 528-31. Both
authorities agree on the minimal proposition asserted here.
32. In the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924), plaintiff-carriers were held to
have standing to challenge an ICC order because the Interstate Commerce Act intended
to protect their interests in equality of treatment. Id. at 266-68. Professor Jaffe believes
this case to be the most important federal standing decision before FCC %. Sanders Brothers
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). JAFFE 507. Cf. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v.
United States, 263 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1923) (plaintiff denied standing to challenge ICC order
where statute failed to recognize its competitive interests). See also 3 DAvs § 22.11. The
Chicago Junction principle has been widely applied in cases brought under the APA. See
Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702, 706-08 (9th Cir. 1965); Berry v. HHFA. 340 F.2d 939 (2d
Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Gart v. Cole,
263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959); Shanks Village Comm. v. Car),, 197 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1952).
33. The language of the statute and the legislative history are dear on this point. See
the discussion of the statutory purpose and Section 105(c) in notes 13 and 14 supra. and also
S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 at 11-12, Part 2 at 6 (1949). See also Note, Pro-
tecting the Standing of Renewal Site Families to Seeh Review of Community Relocation
Planning, 73 YALE L.J. 1080, 1084 (1964). The policies behind the statute are discussed in
ABRANs 81-85 and P. WIENDT, HousuNc Poticy: ThE S.Anc: Fort SoLtnrios 199 (1962).
Congress evidently intended displacees to be beneficiaries of urban renew-al. See pp. 980-81
infra. However, variables other than housing quality are involved in displacement and
relocation. See note 6 supra.
Congress has consistently declared its desire to protect the interests of displaces through
provisions other than 105(c). In 1954 Congress introduced the Workable Program with its
emphasis on overall planning, including the scheduling of relocation facilities and housing
code enforcement. Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 68-560, § 101(c), 68 Stat. 623. as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. I, 1965). See HHFA, TnE WonRADtE PRocLAN-1V'nAr
IT is (1957). See also GaFF 10-11, 111. Relocation payments for displacces were introduced
in 1956, 70 Stat. 1100 (1956), and have been broadened several times since. 42 U.S.C. § 1465
(Supp. I, 1965). The House Report on the Housing and Urban Deielopment Act of 1965
stated that "[y]our committee has continued to seek wa)ys in whidt to assume tht individ-
uals and families displaced by urban renewal projects will be afforded the opportunity to
move into decent, safe, and sanitary housing." H.R. REP. No. 265. 89th Cong., 1st Scss.
30-31 (1965).
34. Alternatively, plaintiffs might wish to argue that Section 10 of the APA e-panded
973
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 77: 966, 1968
The same result emerges from a consideration of the language of
Section 10 itself. That provision, as noted earlier, grants a right of re-
view to persons "suffering legal wrong" or "adversely affected or ag-
grieved.. . within the meaning of a relevant statute,"3 5 Professor Jaffe
has argued that the Chicago Junction Case provides the most appro-
priate definition of "legal wrong" for purposes of administrative law: 0
displacees have "suffered legal wrong" if the statutory prescription in-
tended for their protection has been slighted by HUD. Moreover, cases
under the APA have interpreted the phrase "relevant statute" to in-
dude provisions similar to Section 105(c):3 7 since that section recog-
nizes the interests of displacees, it is a "relevant statute" within the
meaning of which displacees are aggrieved. And, to the extent that
anyone is sufficiently aggrieved by a Section 105(c) finding to claim re-
view under Section 10 of the APA, the argument for displacees' stand-
ing is particularly strong, since they are the parties most directly af-
fected by the agency action and therefore best situated to challenge it
vigorously.
This deductive argument for displacee standing to challenge a finding
of relocation feasibility is reinforced by the peripheral relevance of the
standing precedents on which the courts denying standing were forced
to rely. Both Green Street3  and Harrison-HastedJ" leaned heavily on
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay,40 in which a private power
company was held to lack standing to complain of allegedly illegal pub.
standing. There is some support in the APA legislative history for the idea. See note 81
supra. One possibility is that the APA provides a Sanders-type "persons aggrieved" statute
for all cases-that can be brought under the APA. In Sanders, a statute authorizing "persons
aggrieved" to seek judicial relief was held to justify standing even though plaintiffs could
only allege violation of statutory provisions designed to protect the public interests and
not their private interests. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
See JAFFE 515-17. The position that the APA provides a general "persons aggrieved"
statute was explicitly taken in American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Bd. 112
F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953). See First Natl Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965). Also
Professor Davis' theory that the APA expanded standing to grant a right of review to
anyone "adversely affected in fact" is very similar in its practical consequences. See 13 DAvis
§§ 22.02, .04. Under either theory, displacees would have standing to seek review of the
Section 105(c) finding.
35. See note 19 supra.
36. JAFFE 501-10, 528.
37. See, e.g., Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702, 706-08 (9th Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1964). On the argument advanced here, the two
occasions for standing under the APA overlap significantly, though not completely. See
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Kansas City Power F. Light
Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). Other cases tinder
the APA have applied the "statutory intent to protect" test without attempting to dis-
tinguish between the "adversely affected" and "legal wrong" criteria. See, e.g., Gart v,
Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959).
38. 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967).
39. 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962).
40. 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also note 31 supra.
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lic subsidies to its competitors.4 ' Unlike displacees under the Housing
Act, however, private power companies in Kansas City could make no
claim that the legislation involved made any attempt to provide for
their protection.4 Harrison-HaIsted also cited two decisions denying
standing to challenge certain aspects of urban renewal unrelated to relo-
cation housing. In the first, the Taft Hotel of New Haven was seeking to
block construction of a competitor in a renewal project;3 in the second,
displacees were seeking to require the disposal of renewal land through
competitive bidding." But the Housing Act nowhere protects the inter-
ests of competitors of urban renewal enterprises4 and the bidding re-
quirement was found to be for the protection of the federal treasury, not
displacees. 49 Neither case is authority for denial of standing to plaintiffs'
whose interests are specifically recognized by the Housing Act.
A strong argument can thus be made for the standing of potential dis-
placees under Section 10 of the APA to challenge the Secretary's find-
ing under Section 105(c) of relocation feasibility. But the problem of
standing also arises in a second context, after a finding proper on its
face has been made and HUD has contracted with an LPA for federal
funds. Section 105(c) would be virtually meaningless were the LPA not
then required to relocate displacees in accordance with the plan upon
which the finding of relocation feasibility was based. The person who
is the victim of a renewal project is in the best position to claim that
the LPA has in fact failed to provide satisfactory housing with a mini-
mum of hardship for those displaced.47 And when the argument for
standing at the time of the feasibility finding is acknowledged, a court
recognizing the patent need for review in this second context should
have no difficulty finding standing. Section 105(c) may be read to re-
quire not only a feasibility finding, but also a policing by HUD of its
contract with the LPA, without which the finding could be meaning-
less.48 By this analysis, the displacee would have a remedy against the
41. 225 F.2d at 928-33.
42. Id. at 932.
43. Taft Hotel Corp. v. HHFA, 262 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1958), af'g 162 F. Supp. 538
(D. Conn. 1958).
44. Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959). The Gart case granted displacecs standing
to complain of violations of provisions of the Housing Act designed for their protection.
See pp. 970-71 supra.
45. See the discussion of this point in Berry v. HHFA, 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965).
46. Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959).
47. See note 13 supra.
48. This argument becomes particularly strong when it is realized that a renewal
project typically involves a series of financial aid contracts between HUD and an LPA
often spanning the entire period of displacement and relocation. See RAA, Un.Ah RE-
NEwAL MANUAL § 17. If Section 105(c) is read to require that "there are or are being
provided" standard units as a condition for all contracts for financial aid between HUD
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Secretary of HUD to force him to enforce the contract with the LPA.
A more direct remedy, and therefore a more desirable one, would be
against the LPA itself to force compliance with the contract and the
feasibility finding underlying or incorporated in it. Standing here
should flow from the municipality's assumption of a rehousing obliga-
tion upon signing financial aid contracts with HUD.49 This latter
argument is strengthened by the analogy to the right under private law
for third party beneficiaries to sue upon contracts.r0
To show that Green Street, Harrison-Halsted and Johnson are incon-
sistent with other standing decisions under different sections of the
Housing Act and not dictated by precedent under the general law does
not complete the task, however. The courts may have denied standing
under Section 105(c) for reasons unmentioned in the opinions. To
show that displacees both can and should be granted standing, two
steps remain: (1) to identify the inarticulate factors which influenced
the courts to deny standing under 105(c) but not under 101(c) and
114, and (2) to demonstrate that these reasons no longer, if they ever
did, justify this denial.
Factors Leading the Courts to Deny Standing
If a court granted standing in a situation such as Green Street it
would immediately be faced with two problems: (1) the need to discover
or create adequate standards to review the feasibility of statutory rehous-
and an LPA, then this would necessarily involve HUD in checking the progress of reloca-
tion in each project. The 1965 amendment creating Section 105(c)(2) appears to have ,onic
relevance to this argument. Housing Act of 1949 § 105(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(2) (Supp, I,
1965). That amendment requires that, as a condition of further assistance for a project, the
LPA must furnish HUD with "satisfactory assurance" that it is actually carrying out a
relocation program meeting the requirements of 105(c)(1). The amendment thus supports
the argument for a continuing HUD obligation, but leaves unanswered the question of
whether an independent HUD check is required for a "satisfactory assurance." Moreover,
there is no reason to believe that extracting a satisfactory assurance for the LPA exhausts
HUD's duty under Section 105(c)(1). The amendment may only be indicative of Con-
gressional concern for displacees. See H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-31 (1965).
49. While the LPA obligation to adequately rehouse displacees would appear to follow
necessarily from the statutory provision, it is made explicit in regulations issued by IIUD
and forms a part of the resolution or ordinance passed by the local governing body when
approving the renewal project. RAA, URBAN RENrWAL MANUAL §§ 4-2-2, 1.6-; UIRBAN RE-
NEWAL ADMINISTRATION, TECHNICAL GUIDE No. 9, DETERMINING LOCAL RELOCATION STAN.
DARDS 1-2 (1961). Moreover, the 1965 amendment adding Section 105(c)(2), discussed In note
48 supra, puts the existence of such an obligation beyond question.
50. Obligations imposed on the recipients of federal funds were enforced by third
party beneficiaries in the recent case of Bossier Parish School Bd. v, Lemon, 370 F,2d 847
(5th Cir. 1967). Accord, Montana State Fed. of Labor v. School District No. 1, 7 F. Supp,
82 (D. Mont. 1934). Cf. Merge v Sharott, 841 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1965); United States V. Huff,
165 F.2d 720, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1948). On the rights of third party beneficiaries, see gencrally
4 A. CORBiN, CoNTrr.Acrs §§ 772-779B, 782 (1951).
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ing, and (2) the possibility that the enforcement of Section 105(c) would
result in a substantial curtailment of urban renewal activities. Either or
both of these factors might have weighed in the minds of the judges de-
nying standing. The problem of standards for review, however, is more
apparent than real. On the other hand, the possibility that emphasis on
rehousing would seriously curtail the urban renewal program as it ex-
isted in the 1950's and early 1960's was both obvious and substantial.
(1) Standards for review. Before granting federal funds HUD must
find that rehousing resources consistent with Section 105(c) will be
available to those displaced.5' To so find it must determine, first, that
proper housing can be made available with a reasonable effort and,
second, that the LPA will make such a reasonable effort.5 2 The second
aspect of this determination is a question best left to rather broad
agency discretion. Moreover, a check on LPA activities can be provided
by suits against the municipality at a later point.53 The first aspect can
be reviewed with some precision, however, since the issues are essea-
tially quantitative.
A necessary step in measuring relocation housing availability is the
development of standards for housing meeting Section 105(c)'s require-
ments. This HUD has satisfactorily done. r4 The federal guidelines cover
the structure and facilities of the dwelling units,r5 the maximum rents
51. See note 13 supra.
52. While negligence on the part of the LPA could prevent a feasible plan from being
effectuated, it is doubtful that even exceptional LPA efforts could achieve desirable reloca-
tion if the scheduling of rehousing resources was seriously wide of the mark.
53. See p. 976 supra. The Housing Act and the regulations issued thereunder im-
pose a number of specific obligations on LPA's subsidiary to the overall goal of finding
"decent, safe, and sanitary" housing for displacees. These include (1) providing adequate
notice to site residents, (2) informing those on the relocation workload of their right to
standard rehousing, (3) distributing information on relocation payments and services avail-
able, and (4) conducting an interview with each family to determine its housing needs.
See RAA, URBAN RENEwAL MIANUAL § 16-3-1. It has been found that there is a correlation
between the provision of services such as these and the ultimate success of the relocation
program. Reynolds, Population Displacement in Urban Renewal, 22 U r. J. or EcoN. &
Soc. 113, 117 (1963). However, these services have frequently not been provided. UNmv-nsr
OF PENNSYLVANIA AND NATIONAL AsSoCIATION or HOUSING AND REDEVELOPmE.rT OFFICIALS,
ESSAYS ON THE PROBLEMS FACED IN THE RELOCATION OF ELDERLY PnsoNs 41 (1963). Since
displaced persons can themselves testify in suits involving the LPA, evidentiary problems
in these suits should not be unusually difficult.
54. The federal guidelines can be found in RAA, URBAN RENEwAL MNUAL § 16-2, and
URBAN RENEWAL ADMINISTRATION, TECHNICAL GUIDE N .9, DEflmrinsrI LOCAL RELwOC.-
TION STANDARDS (1961). An earlier but almost identical version of TEcamircA. GuIE No. 9 is
URBAN RENmwAL ADMINISRATON, LOCAL STANDARDS FOR DmTitRNING AccErrAi~rry or
REnousINw REsouRcEs (1958). Charles Abrams, no friend of the present relocation program.
has praised these required specifications. ABrA Ss 135-36. While these standards are local
"guidelines," they leave but little room for LPA discretion.
55. HUD requires that rehousing standards include each of the following elements:
safe, weather-tight structure in good repair, all bathroom facilities with hot and cold run-
ning water for exclusive use of family, kitchen facilities for exclusive use of family, prop-
erly functioning plumbing and sewage disposal system, safe and adequate heating s)stem,
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families can be expected to pay for such units, 6 and the location of the
housing and its accessibility to public and consumer facilities and places
of employment.57 Because these standards are reasonably strict and ap-
pear to effectuate the statutory purpose, it is doubtful that they will be
the focal point of displacee challenges to HUD application of Section
105(c). r8
It is in the area of determining the number of available dwelling
units meeting these standards that displacees and HUD will differ most
sharply. Plaintiffs may wish to begin by attacking certain of the plan-
ning and estimating techniques prescribed by HUD for LPA's. HUD
seems particularly vulnerable for (a) allowing a definition of the LPA
relocation "workload," or number of families that must be rehoused,
adequate and safe wiring and electrical services, a window for every room, space hn ade-
quate proportion to family size and composition to provide privacy and avoid over-
crowding, two separate means of egress, structure free of rats, other vermin and accumula.
tions of garbage or debris. TECHNICAL GUmE No. 9, supra note 54, at 4-5. To the extent
that these standards are incomplete, the regulations also provide that "in no case" should
a displacee be relocated into a unit (1) that is unsafe, unsanitary, or overcrowded ac-
cording to the Local Housing Authority's criteria, (2) that fails to meet the applicable
provision of local housing codes, (3) that is programmed for clearance by any government
agency. Id. at 3-4. The Manual also provides that temporary housing shall (1) be safe,
(2) not be less desirable than the units vacated by displacees, and (3) be mininized as to
both extent and duration. RAA, URAN RENEWAL MANUAL § 16-2-1. These standards for
temporary housing should be elaborated and made more specific. The device of keeping
families on the "workload" for extremely long periods by listing their housing as "tempo
rary" should not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the statute.
56. While noting the need for some flexibility, HUD specifies a rcnt-income ratio of
from .20 to .25 for the average family. These figures are comparable to those developed
independently of HUD. Schorr suggests about 20 per cent as the maximum low-income
families can bear. A Scioa, supra note 2, at 100-01. Congress has recognized the relevance
of this level (its own figure is 25 per cent) in the rent development program. Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1701s(d) (Supp. I, 1965). Twenty per
cent is the figure used by New Haven in its relocation program. New Haven Redevelop-
ment Agency, Relocation Program (current in Oct., 1967, but undated), at 3.
57. Federal standards on these points simply restate the statutory requirements that
relocation housing be not generally less desirable with regard to location, public utilities
and public and commercial facilities than previous housing. TECHNICAL GUma No. 9, supra
note 54, at 6. In individual situations, these standards provide a definite set of constraints
within which relocation must be planned and executed. It should be observed that
blighted areas are frequently well-equipped with these urban amenities. NIEANci: 136,117.
At a minimum, the statute would seem to require that standard housing be provided in
an area that would not require a substantial increase in overall transportation costs for
displacees. These provisions of the Act should also give protection to Negro site rmidents
who would otherwise be displaced in such a way that their racial isolation Is increased.
Thus if Negroes by virtue of their location have access to predominantly white schools,
section 105(c) would seem to require that they be offered relocation housing where equally
desirable schools are available,
58. It has been suggested that relocation agencies should pay more attention to com-
munity qualities of the new neighborhood and should view relocation as an opportunity
for family rehabilitation. NIEBANCK 154-62. If HUD desires to issue regulatiol lImple.
menting these desirable polities, such regulations would certainly not be Inconsistent with
the statute. In the interim, however, there would seem to be very little the courts could
do in this area. HHFA took a small step in the right direction in 1965 by "encouraging"
the LPA's to undertake "optional" diagnostic and referral services. HHFA, LPA Letter
No. 347, Sept. 14, 1965.
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which misses many displacees, 9 (b) permitting the use of private hous-
ing turnover rates as a major index of available relocation housing,cO (c)
not requiring housing surveys to measure available resources,0' and (d)
making no distinction between low-income and overall vacancy rates 12
The inadequacy of HUD-sanctioned LPA planning practices is critical
to the larger question of whether the required housing can in fact be
made available to displacees. Here the court will have to consider (a) the
feasibility of plans for new federally-assisted housing; (b) the size of the
waiting lists for existing public housing; (c) the assistance planned for
those too poor or otherwise unqualified for publicly-supported housing;
(d) the location, rents, and availability (including racial availabilityC3) of
standard units in the private market; and (e) LPA plans for bringing
housing and people together.
Because at present a hearing before HUD on the feasibility of reloca-
tion is neither required nor held 4 -although such a hearing would be
59. See the definition of the "workload" in RAA, URBAN RENEwAL UAL § 16-3-1.
Hartman notes that residents of an area scheduled for clearance start to drift away long
before the property is acquired by the local public body. See Hartman, A Comment on
the HHFA Study of Relocation, in URBAN RrNWAL: Tan REcoRD AND rHE Co.-r.oMr
353-54 T.' Wilson ed. 1966).
60. RAA, URBAN RNEwAL MANUAL § 16-1; City of New Haven, Workable Program
for Community Improvement, May 12, 1967, at 19-22.
61. RAA, URBAN RENEwAL MANUAL § 16-1; AnvisoRy Comt sstON 32-34.
62. RAA, URBAN RENEVAL fANUAL § 16-I; ABPats 145-50. On the general question of
LPA planning and the accuracy of the data used, see Short, Relocation: A Myth or Reality,
3 URBAN AFFAms Q. 62 (1967).
63. In an effort to assure that the effects of private housing discrimination do not result
in an LPA overestimate of the number of units available to Negroes, HUD requires that
a white-nonwhite breakdown be made in dassifying displacees and rehousing resources.
RAA, URBAN RENEWrAL MANUAL §§ 16-1 to -2. A recent challenge to this practice as a
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was rejected by the Seventh Circuit.
Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967). Clearly there are extremely diffi-
cult policy questions involved. Requiring racially integrated relocation has an obvious
appeal, but there are competing considerations, such as the possibility that requiring
integrated relocation would curtail the renewal-rehousing effort. See Piven & Cloward,
Desegregated Housing: Who Pays for the Ref ormers' Ideal? TiE NEw REPu'nuc, Dec. 17,
1966, at 17. See also Grm 58-59. A compromise approach would be to prevent urban
renewal from having the effect of increasing racial isolation. The language of Section
105(c) supports this conclusion. See note 57 supra.
64. The Housing Act of 1949 does not specifically authorize a hearing before the federal
agency, and the APA demands a hearing only where one is required by statute. 5 U.S.C.
§ 554 (Supp. n1, 1965-66). First Nat. Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 1955), dis-
cusses the APA legislative history on this point. Moreover, it has been held that due process
does not require a hearing before the Administrator on the 105(c) determination. Gart v.
Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959). While HUD has not made provision for such a hearing,
it may be advisable for it to do so. Moreover, the argument advanced in the Gart ease on
this point is not altogether convincing.
Section 105(d) of the Housing Act does require a local public hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d)
(1964). This section has been interpreted as requiring a hearing before some municipal
body prior to the approval of the urban renewal plan by the local governing body. The
federal agency does not base its 105(c) decision on information provided at the heatring:
the LPA is only required to supply a copy of excerpts from the minutes. RAA, Urn-N
RENvAL IlA uAL § 4-3. As it presently stands, this procedure hardly qualifies as an
adequate hearing for review purposes. Moreover, it would probably be best not to disturb
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both possible and desirable-the court should receive evidence to estab-
lish its own record for review.05 There are numerous sources of informa-
tion from which to draw besides HUD-LPA data: the Census of Hous-
ing; local housing surveys and other studies of local housing condi-
tions;60 reports on relocation in past renewal projects in the city; and
the testimony of housing market experts, local housing authority person-
nel, and displacees from previous projects. At least in suits under section
10, the court should set aside the agency action if it finds on the whole
record at the end of the trial that in taking such action HUD abused or
exceeded its discretion.6
7
(2) Effects of enforcement on the renewal program. The best explana-
tion of the courts' invocation of the standing doctrine can be found in
the conflict between the requirements of Section 105(c) and the con-
straints under which the renewal program operated during the 1950's
and early 1960's.
As originally conceived and as reflected in its Declaration of Policy,
the Housing Act of 1949 sought slum clearance and rehousing for Amer-
ica's poor.6 8 The slum clearance and public housing titles were designed
to work in tandem:0 9 Section 105(c) of Title I (Slum Clearance) re-
quired that displacees be relocated in standard housing;70 and Section
10(a) of Title II (Public Housing) required that a substandard unit be
cleared for each unit of public housing constructed. 1 Title II autho-
rized 810,000 units of public housing to be built over a six-year period,"-
displacees were given priority in these units,73 and the frequent use
the present interpretation. The 105(d) hearing is useful as part of the local political process
leading up to the approval of the project by the local governing body. At present, this
105(d) hearing would seem to be the only administrative remedy plaintiffs have to
exhaust.
65. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 373 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1967); First Nat'l Banik
v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 271 (4th Cir. 1965); Jordon v. United Ins. Co., 289 F2d 778 (D.C.
Cir. 1961). See JAFFE 186-88, 622-23.
66. See generally TwicheU, Measuring the Quality of Housing in Planning for Urban
Redevelopment, in URBAN REDEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS AND PRACIcrES (C. Woodbury ed,
1953). See also UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, BUREAU OF BUSINESS AND SOCiAL Rrsr.ARCu, How 'To
MfAKE AND USE LocAL HOUSING SURVEYS (1954).
67. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. II, 1965-66); First Nat'l
Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 1965). See JATFE, 187-90, 622-23.
68. See notes 12-13 supra; ABRAMS 74-85; R. DAViES, HOUSING Rr rOi DumNo Trn
TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 101-15 (1966); Bauer, Redevelopment: A Misfit in the Fitlies, in
THE FuT RE OF CrS AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 6, 9 (C. Woodbury ed. 1953),
69. See generally HHFA, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SLUM CLEARANCE AND URliAN
REDEVELOPMENT AND Low-RENT HoUSING (1950).
70. See note 13 supra.
71. Housing Act of 1937 § 10(a), 65 Stat. 631, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (Stipp. 1,
1965).
72. R. DAviEs, supra note 68, at 111.
73. Housing Act of 1937 § 10(g), 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (1964).
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of Title I sites for rehousing displacees was anticipated.74 Other re-
housing resources were to be made available to displacees by the "filter-
ing down" process and by a private housing surplus.¢"
In fact, adherence to the relocation goals of the Act was thwarted by
the failure of the coalition that secured the passage of the legislation in
Congress to function at the local level.70 The worst blow was the wide-
spread public antipathy towards public housing. The National Associa-
ation of Home Builders and other real estate interests launched their
campaign against public housing within a year of the passage of the act.
Playing on the theme that public housing was un-American, the real
estate lobby was instrumental in defeating public housing in twenty-
five of the first thirty-eight public referendums.78 Even liberals objected
to many aspects of the public housing program, particularly its all too
frequent failure to provide a decent living environment for those it
housed.79 As a result, Tide II never gained much support at the local
level.80 Through 1954, only about 150,000 of the authorized units had
been constructed, and Congress in that year cut the annual authoriza-
don from 135,000 to 35,000.11 Since the private housing surplus had
already vanished by the time the act was passed82 and the "fitering
down" process gave rise to few if any adequate units,83 the rejection of
public housing meant that satisfactory relocation housing was virtually
nonexistent.
In the meanwhile, Title I was undergoing a process of redefinition.
Very little happened under the program prior to the mid-1950's.84 Public
apathy, together with a lack of interest in important political and com-
mercial circles, was a major part of the explanation.8 In general, it was
74. This is dear from the language of Section 105(c) itself. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1964).
See also the exchange between Senator Douglas and Commissioner Foltin of the Urban
Renewal Administration during the hearings on the 1954 Housing Act, reported in
ABRAMs 82-84.
75. ABaRsss 79; R. WEAvER, TIE URBAN CotPsr-x 50-52 (1966); Bauer, supra note 63,
at 12-15.
76. Bauer, supra note 68, at 9-10; R. DAVIES, supra note 68, at 125-28; AA,%s 82;
Foard 8= Fefferman, supra note 1, at 67-72.
77. R. DAVIEs, supra note 68, at 126-28.
78. Id.
79. See the discussion in the materials collected in URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLnTcS,
AND PLANNING 413-61 (J. Bellush & M. Hausknecht eds. 1967).
80. Gar-a 7-75; ABRA-s 82.
81. K- Fisna, TwENTY YEARs OF PuBuc: HousINc 102 (1959).
82. Bauer, supra note 68, at 12-18.
83. R. .VEAvER, supra note 75, at 51-52; A. ScHoRR, supra note 2, at 103-10. See also
G. BEYER, HousING AND SocIErY, 344-45 (1965).
84. R. DAvIEs, supra note 68, at 125; ABnws 86.
85. RK DAHL, Wno GovERxs? 117, 129, 139 (1961); PK DAviEs, supra note 68, at 125-26.
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difficult for local political leaders to make the program envisioned by
Congress politically acceptable. If statutory relocation were enforced,
most cities could not have complied without extensive use of public
housing.86 Moreover, since it was not altogether clear for what redevel.
opment purpose Title I could be used, it was difficult to calculate the
patronage the program would create.87 Yet it was dear that a consider-
able amount of hard work was involved and that some people-small
businesses, slumlords, ward bosses-would be hurt no matter how the
program operated.88
Local political support for Title I could coalesce only after it became
clear that HHFA was not going to enforce the relocation requirements
of Section 105(c) 9 and that the federal funds could be used for remov-
ing slums and other eyesores from downtown areas, rebuilding central
business districts, attracting luxury apartment dwellers back from the
suburbs, and improving the city's tax base.00 HHFA's acquiescence on
the enforcement point was particularly important since the sort of
redevelopment envisioned by the program's new business-minded sup-
porters would require widespread demolition and displacement. In this
guise the program could be made financially possible and politically
palatable,91 though not extremely popular even with the middle clas-
ses. 92 Urban renewal thus came to be supported and directed primarily
by those with little or no interest in rehousing the poor.9 3 It contributed
to the economic and aesthetic rejuvenation of many central cities,04
86. See p. 981 supra,
87. R. DAHL, supra note 85, at 117-21, 129; Bauer, supra note 68, at 7-10.
88. R. DAHL, supra note 85, at 117; Bauer, supra note 68, at 7.10.
89. Kaplan reports that URA was willing to wink at Newark's violations of the Work-
able Program. H. KAPLAN, URBAN RENEWAL POLITICs: SLuar CLEARANCE IN NEWARK 3 (1963).
Other studies have reached the same general conclusion. See GREE 97-98; AIRAMS 136-39.
See also materials cited note 2 supra.
90. These were clearly the dominant goals of the program as it emerged in the 1950'9
and early 1960's. Giana 27-29, 91-93, 113-14, 154-60; ABRAMS 167; Long, Local Government
and Renewal Policies, in UaaNs RENEwAL: TuE REcoRD AND THE CONTROVERSY 462-27
(J. Wilson ed. 1966). The 1954 amendments, particularly the 10 per cent allowance for
projects not predominantly residential either before or after the projcct, may have
helped in shifting the goals of the program towards central city build-up, These amend-
ments are discussed in Foard & Fefferman, supra note 1, at 655-59. See also note 12 supra.
91. Long, supra note 90, at 426-27. See also P. Rossi & R. DENTLER, TE o r.LrrTcs ov
URBAN RENEWAL 64 (1961); GREER 113-14, 120.
92. GaEm 37-39.
93. GREER 120-23; P. Rossi & R. DENTLER, supra note 91, 240-74; R. DA1IL, supra note
85, at 115, 123-24, 137-38; Foard & Fefferman, supra note 1, at 671-72; Long, supra note
90, at 426-27; Hartman 278, 281. The tensions between LPA's and local housing authorities
are now well-known. Wacker, Public Housing, Relocation-Are These Two Programs
Working Together? 19 JOURNAL OF HOUSING 265 (1962). See also GREER 70-72.
94. ABRAMs 155-81. See also Slayton, The Operation and Achievements of the Urban
Renewal Program, in URBAN RENEwAL: TuE RECORD AND T11E CoNTRovErsY 202-29 (J.
Wilson ed. 1966).
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while shying away from the job of rehousing those displaced by the new
commercial and apartment complexes.05
A court sitting in the late 1950's or early 1960's might well have sur-
veyed this situation and denied standing out of an appreciation of the
benefits conferred by urban renewal and an unwillingness to jeopardize
or curtail the program by forcing it to shoulder the burden of rehousing
displacees in accordance with Section 105(c). The political structure of
the urban renewal program as it then appeared strongly suggested that
many projects could not be carried out if the courts intervened to re-
quire fulfillment of the statutory relocation requirements. Even were
a court aware of the difficulties faced by displacees, it might have con-
cluded that the gains accruing to the community as a whole were worth
the costs of inadequate relocation. The district court in Green Street
seems to have reasoned in precisely this manner:
This Court is aware of the problems to be solved in the relocation
of persons displaced by urban renewal plans. However, if this litiga-
tion were permitted to restrain the civic action, it would be stand-
ing in the path of progress already made and perpetuating the de
facto segregation already existing to the detriment of those that this
action purportedly seeks to protect.00
One may question whether a court should ever rely on policy con-
siderations of this sort in making a standing decision. One may also
question whether the courts in Johnson, Harrison-Halsted, and Green
Street correctly evaluated the various social interests even on the basis
of then-available information. But whatever force the policy arguments
for denying standing may have had five or ten years ago, the subsequent
march of events has left them with little or no relevance.
Changes in the political context within which the renewal program
operates today as well as our improved understanding of relocation and
related urban problems suggest that a re-evaluation of the role of
the federal courts is in order.
Crucial among the new considerations are legislative changes
95. After noting the dramatic shift away from the original purpose of the Act, Abrams
concludes:
[T]he legislation which Congress had enacted to help solve the slum problem was
evicting many more slum dwellers than it was rehousing. It w'as only one of the
many examples of how legislation passed with the best of intentions is ultimately
perverted during the administrative process. In the long run, the profit motive some-
how operates as the undesignated but effective legislator while the public obligation
is pushed under the rug. ARASts 84.
96. 250 F. Supp. 139, 147 (N.D. IlL 1966). Besides the 105(c) challenge. Green Street
also involved a complaint that only segregated relocation facilities were being made
available. See note 63 supra.
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which, taken together, indicate a redirection of the federal urban re-
newal program towards goals more closely approximating those of the
drafters of the 1949 Act. In 1964 and 1965, amendments to Section
105(c) Congress again stressed the importance of rehousing displacees9 7
To this end, the range of federal assistance for displacees has been con-
siderably expanded. Public housing has grown at an accelerated rate
during the 1960's and has recently been made more accessible to dis-
placeesY5 Federal assistance for housing for the elderly, who constitute
a significant percentage of displacees 99 has been greatly increased. 100
The FHA 220 and 221 mortgage insurance programs have been
amended, particularly by the addition of 221(d)(3), so as to strengthen
considerably the prospects of statutory relocation.101 Section 221(d)(3 )
housing could be a particularly effective relocation resource when com-
bined with the new rent supplement program,102 for which displacees
are eligible.10 3 Finally, financial assistance directly available to dis-
placees under the Housing Act of 1949 itself has been increased. 10 In
97. See note 13 supra.
98. By early 1966, the public housing stock had increased to 610,000 units. PUBLIC
HOUSING Atmorrm REP., PROGRAm STATUS (Statistics Branch. Mar. 15, 1966). This rep-
resents a doubling of the number of units in the 1960's. Persons displaced by government
action and the elderly have priority in getting into public housing units. See note 73
supra. The Housing Act of 1964 authorized a special payment to local housing authorities
to enable them to take in more displaced families below the minimum acceptable income
limit. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1964). The new "leased housing program" managed by local
housing authorities may also increase the supply of low-income housing available to dis-
placees. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 23, 42 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (Supp. I,
1965).
99. About 20 per cent of displaced households have had a family head over 60 years
old. NIEaANcK 15.
100. The various programs are described in NIEBANCK 72-78.
101. Observers of the relocation scene have been particularly hopeful of the new
221(d)(3) program introduced in 1961. This program provides 'HA-insurcd mortgages
typically at below-market interest rates to limited dividend corporations for the construe-
tion of housing for low- and moderate-income families. Housing Act of 1961, 12 U.S.C.
§ 17151 (1964). In 1965 Congress greatly increased the subsidy by reducing the maximum
interest rate to 3 per cent. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 102(b). 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715l(d)(5) (Supp. I, 1965). The utility of this program for relocation purposes is set
out in R. WEAVER, supra note 75, at 87-88, 116-20. The use of the 221(d)(3) program Is
likely to expand greatly as a result of the 1966 amendment requiring that urban renewal
sites, unless redeveloped for predominantly non-residential purposes, be used to provide
a substantial number of standard units for moderate and low-income families. Housing
Act of 1949 § 105(f), 1966 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 1497. Other amendments to F-IA's
220 and 221 programs should also make statutory rehousing less troublesome. See, e.g.,
National Housing Act §§ 220(h), 221(d)(2), 221(h), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715k, 17151 (Supp. 1, 196 ),
102. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 17Ols (Supp, 1,
1965). For a discussion of the operation of the supplement program, see Note, GovernmentHousing Assistance To the Poor, 76 YAus: L.J. 508, 518-35 (1967),
10). Displacees are one of the five categories of persons eligible for rent supplements,
12 U.S.C. § 17Ols(c)(2)(A) (Supp. I, 1965).104. The Section 114 relocation payments under the Housing Act of 194!9 were conl
siderably strengthened by 1964 and 1965 amendments. To the existing provsion for tilepayment of moving costs have been added a short-term rent subs dy (not to exceed s0
per family) and a provision for the payment to displacees of expenses incidental to thetransfer of real property. 42 U.S.C. § 1465(c)(2), § 1465(d) (Supp. I, 1965).
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addition to expanding rehousing resources, Congress has also sought
to limit the social upheavals caused by the program. The new reliance
on rehabilitation and housing code enforcement, with the consequent
drop in displacements, is the best example. 05 Pursuant to these new
policies, HUD has recently emphasized to LPA's that top priority be
given to conserving and rebuilding the low-income housing supply.100
The new federal legislation should bring the supply and demand for
relocation rehousing closer, thereby loosening one of the major con-
straints on the earlier program.
A second group of changes involve the local political setting of the re-
newal program. Three aspects of the new political situation seem partic-
ularly relevant. First, the scope of the program has increased greatly, in-
dicating a significant reduction in public resistance to publicly-financed
renewal. 10 7 Urban renewal is no longer exceptional, and cities are ex-
pected to have redevelopment programs. There may also be more public
awareness of an "urban crisis" and of the need for federal assistance.
Second, where renewal has succeeded, powerful real estate, political and
commercial interests have come to depend on the federal largess.103 Ur-
ban renewal has become a significant source of political patronage, and
considerable local resources have become committed to continued ac-
tion to the point that they will be difficult to extract. Third, whereas in
an earlier day the primary political problems were overcoming apathy
and winning the support of conservative business elements in the com-
munity,10 9 today's opposition increasingly comes from organized and
105. Amendments in 1964 made housing code enforcement compulsory for participation
in urban renewal, Housing Act of 1949 § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1964), and also
provided that no housing units should be demolished unless rehabilitation is found by the
Administrator to be unworkable. Housing Act of 1949 § 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1964).
In 1965 rehabilitation grants for low-income site residents and code enforcement grants
for cities were authorized. Housing Act of 1949 §§ 115, 117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1466, 1463 (Supp.
I, 1965). For a discussion of the new emphasis, see R. WEA VE , supra note 10, at 65-77,
105-09. See also ABRA ts 184-207.
106. LPA Letter No. 418, May 19, 1967.
107. The program has grown to the extent that cumulative commitments today are
nearly $6 billion. HUD, REPORT OF URBAN RFNEWAL OPERATioNs, March 31, 1967, at 2.
This should be compared with $74 million in commitments in 1954. AmRts 86. The in-
creasing acceptance of the program is also shown in this report on progress by then-
Administrator Weaver:
By June, 1964, we anticipate that the urban renewal program will involve about
1560 projects in 750 cities. The area encompassed by these projects will be about
120,000 acres (185 square miles) which is equal to the combined area of Atlanta and
Louisville. In this gross area a little over half, 65,000 acres, will ultimately be acciuired,
cleared, and redeveloped. We estimate that communities will demand, and can intelli-
gently use, under current conditions, 700 million dollars or more of federal assistance
each year in their urban renewal programs.
P. WEAVER, supra note 75, at 93.
108. F.. BANFIELt & J. Wt.soN, Crry Pourrics 220, 259-63 (1965); Aun.sss 110-31;
Long, supra note 90, at 426-27; Wilhelm, supra note 11, at 8.
109. See pp. 981-82 supra.
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disaffected slumdwellers themselves.110 Where such groups exist, they
should heighten the interest of local politicians in achieving adequate
relocation. Thus, not only is the local program stronger and more resili-
ent today than a few years ago, but also there are independent forces
shifting the politics of renewal in the direction of better relocation.
Finally, the violence which tore many cities last summer has sharp-
ened our understanding of the urban crisis and urban renewal's relation
to it. The social costs of the continued neglect of those in the slums and
ghettos of our cities are more than a rational nation would be willing to
pay. Newark and New Haven-two cities which have had large-scale
clearance programs-were among the cities in which ghetto riots
erupted last summer; in both cities, these projects have been cited as
substantial factors contributing to the frustration and outrage which fi-
nally exploded.' 1
Under these circumstances, judicial review of relocation could serve
a valuable and creative function. The expanded availability of federal
aids for rehousing displacees together with the changed local political
context and the more flexible character of the renewal problem itself
suggest that today most cities would be able to continue redevelopment
and honor the requirements of Section 105(c). Judicial review, or the
threat thereof, could insure that rehousing resources were used to the
fullest extent of their availability."12 The recent improvement in re-
location under HUD prodding indicates the efficacy of such a policy.'13
Without review, however, there is no guarantee that HUD will enforce
Section 105(c) and, therefore, no guarantee that available resources
will be used.
To the extent that rehousing resources are still not available, judicial
review would force into the open what remains of the contradiction
within the program. By enjoining displacement where adequate re-
housing was not available, the courts not only would be supporting a
sound public policy but also would be generating pressures that could
lead to a legislative solution. That legislative action would be forth-
coming is suggested by the increasing strength of the program at the
110. Renewal in New Haven is meeting increasing opposition from such groups.
Wilhdm, supra note 11, at 10. The Green Street Association, an organization of potential
displacees, recently fought a Chicago project into the courts. See p. 970 supra. See
also note 11 supra.
111. Anderson, The Voices of Newark, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1967, at 85; Wilhelm, supra
note 11.
112. After a thorough study of the relocation problem, the Advisory Committee on
Intergovernmental Relations concluded that "[rielocation can be vastly improved with
better administration of present laws and regulations." ADviSORY COMMIssoN 127.
113. See note 10 supra.
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local level and the recent Congressional re-emphasis of the importance
of statutory relocation. Moreover, the legislative solution could be
relatively straightforward: since Congress has already created a work-
able framework of relocation assistance,114 the problem is essentially
one of appropriating the necessary funds."1
114. See p. 984 supra.
115. The conclusions of the Advisory Commission's study lend support to the argu-
ments advanced here:
Assurance of standard housing is uniquely germane to the purposes of urban
renewal and public housing programs as it is not to other Federal grant programs.
It is also true that persons displaced may presently be living in substandard housing,
and that assuring a standard housing supply requires many types of action, public
and private, governing the total supply of housing. However, the Commission believes
the goal of providing standard housing for all is of such preeminent importance that
its availability should be assured even if it means a delay in a federally aided project.
Establishing this requirement for all Federal grant programs would probably, in fact,
furnish considerable stimulus to the elimination of substandard housing.
ADvisoRy CorAnnssloN 116.
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